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QUID PRO QUO:
PIERCING THE REPORTER’S  PRIVILEGE  FOR  
MEDIA WHO RIDE ALONG
Dina Hovsepian*
The  reporter’s  privilege,  also  known  as  the  reporter’s  shield  law,  exists to protect reporters from forced disclosure regarding confidential information and sources. Stemming from the First Amendment right to freedom of press, this privilege seeks to safeguard the free flow of information.
However, reporters are frequently participating in media ride-alongs during
which they are permitted to accompany police officers in their daily duties.
As a result of these ride-alongs, reporters witness arrests, search warrant
executions, and crime scene investigations. When subsequently subpoenaed to testify during the criminal trial related to those events, these reporters assert their privilege and refuse to testify. Often times, courts uphold
their privilege. However, doing so infringes on the criminal defendant’s  
Sixth  Amendment  right  to  a  fair  trial.    An  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege should be implemented when a reporter participates in a media ridealong since testifying to their eyewitness accounts would not violate the
purpose of the privilege. Mandating that the reporters testify would not
disrupt the free flow of information, nor would it require disclosure of confidential information. Instead, such an exception would only require reporters to testify to information witnessed as the result of the policepermitted ride-along. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial
trumps the First Amendment right to freedom of press in this context, further supporting an exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege.    
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A. University of California, Los Angeles,
2009. The author would like to dedicate this Comment to her eldest brother, Patrick, for defining
true strength and determination. She would also like to thank her family (her father Razmik,
mother Hilda, and brother Nicholas) for their continued support and guidance through her endeavors. She would not be the person she is today without their love, humor, and inspiration. A
special thank you to Laurie Levenson for her academic assistance and responsiveness to the endless e-mails and to Mark Geragos for his valuable insight. The author thanks Teo for his endless
encouragement and motivating words, and Tina and Linette for lending their ears throughout the
drafting and editing process. And not to be forgotten, her greatest gratitude to the talented and
hardworking staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their dedication
and meticulous work in the production of this Comment.
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“Over  the  last  several  decades,  the  media’s  role  has  morphed  from  that  of  
watchdog against police abuse to cheerleader for the prosecution. The
protections afforded the reporter to shield them as against a Defendant’s  
right to a fair trial have become quaint in our modern 24/7 media age. Reporters who embed themselves with the police must realize that the price
for such access comes at the expense of the First Amendment not the Sixth
Amendment  guarantee  of  a  defendant’s  right  to  fair  trial.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Crime Scene, the Police, and the Reporter
Imagine it is 11:37 PM on a Tuesday night when a swarm of Los Angeles Police Department officers arrive at an underground brothel where a
murder has taken place. Riding along with the police is a reporter from the
Los Angeles Times. At the scene, the reporter documents evidence of the
murder and watches the police conduct the crime scene investigation. The
reporter observes an officer surreptitiously take a knife from the scene and
slip it into his pocket, clearly obstructing evidence.2
Two months later, at the trial for the murder, the reporter is subpoenaed to testify. He refuses, asserting the reporter’s  privilege.    As  a  result,  
the  jury  never  learns  of  the  police  officer’s  obstructive  actions.    The  criminal defendant, who might have been acquitted had the reporter testified, is
found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.3
A   criminal   defendant’s   right   to   a   fair   trial   is   inscribed   in   the   Sixth  
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process

1. E-mail from Mark J. Geragos, Esq., Geragos & Geragos, P.C., to author (Mar. 30, 2012,
14:29 PST) (on file with author).
2. Hypothetical created by author. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal.
1990); United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (illustrating examples of media
ride-alongs with the police).
3. Hypothetical created by author. See, e.g.,  Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  So.  
2d 577 (Fla. 1990); Delaney, 789 P.2d 934 (illustrating examples of reporters who went on ridealongs  and  subsequently  refused  to  testify  by  asserting  the  reporter’s  privilege).
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for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.4
The   reporter’s   privilege,   a   lesser   but   nonetheless   recognized   right,   now  
stands in the way of that constitutional right.5
B. A Need for an Exception to the Privilege
Privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient
privilege,  and  the  reporter’s  privilege  are  established  to  encourage  candor  
within those practice areas.6 However,  the  reporter’s  privilege, more than
the  others,  infringes  upon  a  criminal  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.7 Because police departments allow media members to ride along with them
during critical events such as crime scene investigations, reporters are often
exposed to evidence that is crucial for the defense.8 However, those reporters frequently refuse to testify during the subsequent criminal trial.9
During a media ride-along, the police department allows a member of
the  media  to  “ride  along”  with  them  in  the  course  of  their daily activities.10

4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (stating that the judicial
system   “depend[s]   on   full   disclosure   of   all   the   facts,   within   the   framework   of   the   rules   of   evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense.”).    If  reporters  are  allowed  to  refuse  to  testify,  they  may  be  withholding critical facts. Id.
Therefore,   the   privilege   stands   in   the   way   of   the   defendant’s   right   to   a   fair   trial. Id.; see also
Delaney,   789   P.2d   at   937   (“[A]   newsperson’s   protection   under   the   shield   law   must   yield   to   a  
criminal  defendant’s  constitutional  right  to  a  fair  trial  when  the  newsperson’s  refusal  to  disclose  
information  would  unduly  infringe  on  that  right.”).
6. See United  States  v.  Shibley,  112  F.  Supp.  734,  741  (S.D.  Cal.  1953)  (“The  object  of  the  
[attorney-client]   privilege   is   to   protect   the   client   against   disclosure   of   confidential   matters.”);;   3  
BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHART. CRIMINAL EVID. § 11:47 (15th ed.
1999)  (“Moreover,  the  purpose  of  the  [physician-patient] privilege is to protect the patient  .  .  .  .”);;  
2 LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 16-1   (4th   ed.   2011)   (“[J]ournalists  and  
news organizations in the United States today enjoy, in many circumstances, a privilege from
compelled disclosure  of  information  .  .  .  .”).
7. See generally Nixon, 418  U.S.  at  709  (stating  that  the  judicial  system  “depend[s]  on  full  
disclosure  of  all  the  facts    .  .  .  .”).    If  reporters  are  allowed  to  refuse  to  testify,  they  may  be  withholding critical facts. See generally id. Therefore, the privilege stands in the way of the defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial. See generally id.
8. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (stating that a reporter on a media ride-along was present during
the search of defendant, and subsequently was subpoenaed to testify to whether defendant consented to the search or not).
9. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561
So. 2d 577; Jean Guccione, Writer Must Testify in Blake Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at B3.
10. See Karen M. Markin, An   “Unholy   Alliance”:      The Law of Media Ride-Alongs, 12
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 33, 33 n.4 (2004).
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Media members take footage of crime scene investigations,11 photograph
houses during the execution of search warrants,12 participate in witness interviews,13 and record detailed notes of their observations.14 While some of
this information is released in newspaper articles and news programs, some
significant details remain secrets with the reporter.15
This   Article   proposes   an   exception   to   the   reporter’s   privilege   that  
would only apply to reporters who have participated in media ride-alongs
and who have been subpoenaed to testify in a criminal case. Section II
will trace the historical development of media ride-alongs and their interaction with criminal cases. Section III will explore the history of the
reporter’s  privilege,  including  its development and limitations. Finally,
Section IV will suggest that in order to ensure a fair trial for the criminal
defendant, reporters who participate in media ride-alongs should be required to preserve and produce at trial all notes taken during media ridealongs. Incidentally, this narrow exception would protect the underlying
policy   of   the   reporter’s   privilege16 while simultaneously protecting the
rights of criminal defendants.17

11. See People v. Hendrix, 820 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (App. Div. 2006) (discussing that ABC
Network filmed footage associated with a homicide while on a ride-along).
12. See Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151 (explaining that a CBS cameraman filmed for twenty
minutes during the execution of a search warrant).
13. Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence at 8, People v. Blake, No. LA040377
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 4, 2004) (stating that reporter Miles Corwin participated in witness interviews).
14. Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (stating that the reporter was present and
took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine).
15. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937, 953 (explaining that the reporter was with the police
when the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of
the few people who knew exactly what happened. Although the reporter wrote an article regarding the arrest, that article did not address the issue of consent.).
16. The  reporter’s  privilege  seeks  to  maintain  the  flow  of  information  by  ensuring  that  confidences will not be revealed, but the defendant being subject to a search warrant has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality pertaining to the reporter at that time. Wright v. F.B.I., 381 F.
Supp.  2d  1114,  1116  (C.D.  Cal.  2005)  (stating  the  reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  promote  the  “free  
flow   of   information”);;   see also In re Slack,   768   F.   Supp.   2d   189,   193   (D.D.C.   2011)   (“Courts  
have minimized impositions upon the press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect
on  a  reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather   news.”).    However,  reporters  who  participate  in  
media ride-alongs are not present for the purpose of a scheduled meeting or photo shoot. See,
e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (emphasizing that the reporters were accompanying the police with
the  police’s  permission).    The  reporter is present as a mere observer, not a confidant. See, e.g.,
Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that reporter
Miles Corwin was present to observe the investigation).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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II. A NEW PHENOMENON: THE MEDIA RIDE-ALONG
Generally,  the  reporter’s privilege allows reporters to refuse to testify
about confidential sources and specific information obtained in the newsgathering process.18 The development of this privilege stems from a combination of the First Amendment, state statutes, and case law.19
The media has become increasingly intertwined with the judicial system.20 In   light   of   the   public’s   insatiable   appetite   for   news   regarding   the  
criminal justice system,21 police departments are now frequently allowing
media  members  to  go  on  a  “ride”22—and the “ride”  referred  to  is  not  just  a  
tour of the streets.23 Instead, members of the media are exposed to arrests,
executions of warrants, accident reports, and abuse incidents.24 During this
“ride,”  reporters  are  allowed  to  take  notes  and  film  footage  for  use  in subsequent articles and television clips.25
However, it is not mandatory for the reporters to produce the material
obtained during the ride-along upon demand—the   reporter’s   privilege   allows them to refuse any request for disclosure of confidential sources or

18. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-1   (“[J]ournalists   and   news   organizations   in   the  
United States today enjoy, in many circumstances, a privilege from compelled disclosure of
information  .  .  .  .”).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1990);
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901-09 (1991); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603 (1999); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1958); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990).
20. RICHARD L. FOX ET AL., TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIM. JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA
FRENZY 1 (2d ed. 2007), available at https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47d9507ee3854.pdf
(“Starting  around  1990,  Americans  began  to  repeatedly  focus  on  lengthy, high-profile, often celebrity-centered criminal and civil trials and investigations. Many of these cases at times resembled something like national obsessions and were associated with extraordinary levels of mass
media  coverage.”).
21. See id. at 2–5.
22. Markin, supra note 10, at 33 n.4.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining
that the CBS news crew was invited to attend the execution of a search warrant); Miami Herald
Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  So.  2d  577,  578  (Fla.  1990)  (stating  that  the  journalist  was  allowed  to  
accompany the police to the airport).
24. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151 (explaining that the CBS news crew was invited to
attend the execution of a search warrant); Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (stating
that the journalist was allowed to accompany the police to the airport).
25. See, e.g., Miami   Herald   Publ’g   Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (discussing that the journalist
produced an article after witnessing an arrest at the airport while on a ride-along); Delaney, 789
P.2d at 937 (stating that the reporter published an article on an incident observed while on a ridealong at the Long Beach Mall).
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private information.26 This refusal is allowed despite the fact that the reporter is exposed to an enormous amount of information during the ridealong,   and   that   producing   that   information   would   further   the   defendant’s  
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.27 Therefore, in light of the criminal
defendant’s   constitutional   rights   at   stake,   it   should   be   mandatory   that   reporters on ride-alongs produce their notes and footage when subpoenaed in
order to ensure a fair trial for the criminal defendant.28
A. A Brief History of the Media Ride-along and
Its  Relationship  with  the  Reporter’s  Privilege
In  an  effort  to  educate  community  members  regarding  police  officers’  
daily   duties,   police   departments   allow   “ride-alongs.”29 These ride-alongs
are not only available to the general public, but to the media as well.30 It is
quite simple to apply for the opportunity.31 For example, the Los Angeles
City Police Department only requires applicants to complete and submit a
one-page  form  titled  “Ride-Along Agreement Assuming Risk of Injury or
Damage  Waiver,  Indemnity  and  Release  of  Claims.”32 The agreement requires standard contact information—such as name, address, and phone
number—and a signature releasing the City of Los Angeles and the Police
Department from liability in the event of an injury or resulting damage.33
Other municipalities have more onerous requirements.34 For example, the City of New York Police Department requires the applicant to release the City of New York from potential lawsuits and to abide by certain

26. See U.S.  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Comm’n  v.  McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 390 F. Supp.
2d 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2005); see also LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-1  (“[J]ournalists  and  news  
organizations in the United States today enjoy, in many circumstances, a privilege from compelled  disclosure  of  information  .  .  .  .”).
27. Delaney,  789  P.2d  at  937  (“[A]  newsperson’s  protection  under  the  shield  law  must  yield  
to  a  criminal  defendant’s constitutional  right  to  a  fair  trial  when  the  newsperson’s  refusal  to  disclose information  would  unduly  infringe  on  that  right.”).  
28. See id.
29. See Ride-Along, MANASSAS PARK POLICE, http://manassasparkpolice.com/ride-along.htm
(last modified Sept. 4, 2011).
30. See Los Angeles City Police Department, Ride-Along Agreement Assuming Risk of Injury or Damage Waiver, Indemnity and Release of Claims (on file with author).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Community Affairs | Community Participation Programs, NYPD, http://www.
nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/community_affairs/community_participation_programs.shtml (last visited Dec. 7, 2012) (referencing Ride Along Program portion of website).
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rules of conduct.35 The  application  provides  that  “the  use  of  cameras,  recording devices and cell phones are prohibited.”36 In addition, the application   requires   that   “[m]embers   of   the   Media . . . must state, on a separate
sheet, the reason(s) for participating  in  the  Ride  Along  [sic].”37 Additional
requirements, such as a separate explanation of the reason for a ride-along,
are required in some departments, and suggest that some police departments are aware of the negative implications of the media ride-along.38
Indeed, unforeseen consequences have led to lawsuits that clarify the
legal scope of ride-alongs.39 For instance, on April 16, 1992, the United
States Marshals Service invited a Washington Post reporter and photographer to witness the execution of a search warrant against Dominic Wilson.40 After realizing that Wilson was not in the house, the Marshals left
with the media crew, but not before the reporter investigated the house and
the photographer took a few pictures.41 The United States Supreme Court
found   that   although   the   media’s   presence   sufficed   as   a   violation   of   Wilson’s  Fourth  Amendment  rights,42 the Court had not previously made clear
that such a presence would constitute a violation, and, therefore did not
hold the police liable.43 However, the Court  did  discuss  the  media’s  presence at length and concluded that the reasons provided by the police for the
media ride-along in that case were not justified.44 Wilson was not the first,
nor will it be the last civil case to stem from a media ride-along.45
Criminal defendants have also taken issue with the presence of the
media in their homes or during arrests.46 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Morejon, a Miami Herald journalist witnessed an arrest for possession of

35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. 603; Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149;
Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d 577.
40. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607.
41. Id. at 607–08 (confirming that photographs were taken while on the ride-along, but never published).
42. Id. at 614.
43. Id. at 617–18.
44. Id. at 611–14.
45. See, e.g., Miami   Herald   Publ’g   Co., 561 So. 2d at 577–78 (discussing a criminal defendant bringing civil suit against a reporter to compel testimony regarding notes taken while on a
ride-along).
46. See, e.g., id.; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149.
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cocaine during a media ride-along.47 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the  district  court’s  denial  of  a  reporter’s  privilege  assertion,  but  noted  Justice  
White’s  distinction  in  Branzburg v. Hayes that the restriction only applied to
“grand  jury  investigations  conducted  in  good  faith.”48 More specifically, the
court  cited  Justice  Powell’s  concurring  opinion,  which  stated  that  on  a  caseby-case   basis,  the   “‘privilege   should   be  judged   on   its   facts   by   striking   the  
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.’”49
Robert  Blake’s  2005  murder  trial  further  addressed  the  new  phenomenon of media ride-alongs.50 Former Los Angeles Times reporter Miles Corwin spent a year shadowing the Los Angeles Police Department while doing
research for his book.51 As a result, Corwin was present during the homicide investigation of Robert Blake for the murder of his wife in 2001.52
Subsequently, Corwin was subpoenaed to testify in the Blake trial.53 Corwin attempted to raise the reporter’s  privilege  as  his  shield,  but  the  court  de47. Miami   Herald   Publ’g   Co., 561 So. 2d at 578. The journalist was given permission to
accompany the Metro-Dade police officers while on duty at the Miami International Airport. Id.
The officers arrested Morejon for trafficking in four kilos of cocaine. Id. The journalist took
notes while the arrest occurred and later published an article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic
Magazine containing some information that was inconsistent with what the police officers had
reported. Id. During   his  trial,  Morejon  learned  of  the  journalist’s  eyewitness   account and subpoenaed him to appear for a deposition. Id. Although the journalist filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, the judge denied the motion and demanded he testify. Id. The journalist petitioned the
district court for a writ of certiorari, but the  district  court  denied  the  motion,  holding  that  the  “reporter’s  qualified  privilege  simply  ‘has  utterly  no  application  to  information  learned  by  a  journalist as a result of being  an  eyewitness  to  a  relevant  event  in  a  subsequent  court  proceeding’  such  as
the  police  search  and  arrest  of  Morejon.”    Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578.
48. Id. at 579, 582.
49. Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring)); see also Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 149. The United States Secret Service allowed a CBS
crew to accompany it during the execution of a search warrant. Id. at 151. Although the defendant Ayeni was not home at the time of invasion, CBS captured footage of his wife and son despite
their request otherwise. Id. at 151–52. Ayeni requested the CBS footage, believing the evidence
would help in his motion to dismiss the indictment, but CBS refused,  claiming  a  reporter’s  privilege under New York Civil Rights Law Section 79-h. Id. at 151. Recognizing that the privilege
is not absolute and can be overcome if the three-pronged test discussed later in this article is satisfied, the court held that the requested videotapes were not obtainable elsewhere and were necessary and thus must be produced, but allowed CBS to obscure the identity of any confidential
sources it had agreed to protect. Id. at 154, 160–61.
50. Guccione, supra note 9; see also Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence,
supra note 13, at 8 (discussing that reporter Miles Corwin, participating in a ride-along, was
present  during  the  investigation  of  Robert  Blake’s  home for evidence relating to the murder of
his  wife.    Corwin  asserted  his  reporter’s  privilege  when  asked  to  testify  regarding  the  events  of  
the investigation.).
51. Guccione, supra note 9.
52. Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8.
53. See Guccione, supra note 9.
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nied him the privilege.54 The  court  ruled  that  “Corwin  had  waived  his  shield  
law  rights”  because  of  a  signed  agreement  between  Corwin  and  the  Los  Angeles  Police  Department  explaining  “that  his  work  product may be subject
to subpoena and production in either criminal and/or civil litigation.”55
If   the   reporter’s   privilege   exists   to   maintain   the   flow   of   truthful   information to the public,56 then the truth should also be communicated during the criminal defendant’s   trial.57 As in the case of Miles Corwin,58
courts must require reporters to continue this flow of information where
necessary.59 Therefore, it is vital to appreciate why this privilege exists and
to understand that the reasons to expose the information obtained during a
media ride-along outweigh the policy justifications behind the privilege.
B. A Philosophical Interjection:
Why Are Reporters Even Allowed on Ride-alongs?
If the reasons for concealing information outweighed the benefits, then
one might   understand   why   the   reporter’s   privilege   would   be   upheld   in   a  
criminal case.60 However, they do not.61 The Wilson v. Layne opinion illuminates the reasoning behind the media ride-along.62 Similarly, other possible justifications for the media ride-along are thoroughly analyzed in the article,   “An   ‘Unholy   Alliance’: The Law of Media Ride-Alongs.”63 While
Wilson and “An ‘Unholy Alliance’” take different approaches, they ultimately conclude that there is no legitimate justification for a media ride-along.64

54. Id.
55. See id. (explaining that according to the agreement Corwin signed with the police department,  “[he]  understood  ‘that  his  work  product  may  be  subject  to  subpoena  and production in
either   criminal   and/or   civil   litigation’   and   acknowledged   that,   ‘by   his   involvement   in   homicide  
investigations,  [he]  becomes  an  “agent”  of  the  Police  Department.’”    In  accordance  with  this  finding, a reporter should understand that he or she  waives  his  or  her  reporter’s  privilege  when  participating in a media ride-along.).
56. See Wright v. F.B.I., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
57. See Guccione, supra note 9.
58. Id.
59. See Branzburg,  408  U.S.  at  680  (“[A]  reporter  should  not  be  forced  either  to appear or
testify  before  a  grand  jury  or  at  trial  until  and  unless  sufficient  grounds  are  shown  .  .  .  .”).
60. See id. (“[A]  reporter  should  not  be  forced  either  to  appear  or  testify  before a grand jury
or  at  trial  until  and  unless  sufficient  grounds  are  shown  .  .  .  .”).
61. See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
62. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–13.
63. Markin, supra note 10.
64. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–14; Markin, supra note 10, at 37.
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1. Wilson v. Layne: The  United  States  Supreme  Court’s  Opinion on the
Justifications for Media Ride-Alongs
In Wilson v. Layne, the United States Supreme Court considered the
justifications for allowing media ride-alongs during the execution of a
search warrant.65 The  Court  rejected  the  police  department’s  argument  that  
“officers  should  be  able  to  exercise  reasonable  discretion  about  when  [the  
ride-alongs]  would  ‘further  their  law  enforcement  mission . . . in executing
a   warrant.’”66 The Court held that allowing media to enter the homes of
suspects would defeat the underlying purpose of the Fourth Amendment
and the protection it provides for private homes.67
The   Court   also   rejected   the   police   department’s   argument   that   because  the  reporter’s  privilege  stems  from the First Amendment and seeks to
encourage  a  flow  of  information  to  the  public,  the  “presence  of  third  parties  
could  serve  the  law  enforcement  purpose  of  publicizing  the  government’s  
efforts to combat crime, and facilitate accurate reporting on law enforcement   activities.”68 The Court held that when balancing the First Amendment right with the Fourth Amendment right at stake, the Fourth Amendment right must take precedence.69 Although  “the  need  for  accurate  reportreporting   on   police  issues”   is   important,   this   interest  “in   general  bears   no  
direct relation to the constitutional justification for the police intrusion into
a  home  in  order  to  execute  a  felony  arrest  warrant.”70
The Court also pointed out that the search warrant did not permit the
media’s   presence   inside the house.71 As the Court explained, the Fourth
Amendment is a representation of respect—a   “centur[y]-old   principle”—
that is deemed necessary to protect the private home.72 Although the police
in Wilson had obtained a valid search warrant, the Court found that the
presence of the media members did not further the objectives that allowed
the police into the private home pursuant to that warrant.73 For this reason,

65. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–13.
66. Id. at 612.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at  613  (“Fourth  Amendment  also  protects  a  very  important  right,  and  in  the  present  
case it is in terms of that right that the media ride-alongs  must  be  judged.”).
70. Id.
71. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611.
72. Id. at 610.
73. Id. at 611.
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the  media’s  presence  was  not  in  congruence  with  the  intentions  of  the  respected and superior Fourth Amendment.74
Finally,  the  police  department  argued  that  the  “presence  of  third  parties could serve . . . to minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and also  to  protect  the  safety  of  the  officers.”75 Since the police did not limit this
argument to  instances  where  the  media  entered  a  suspect’s  home  with  the  
police, this policy could extend beyond media ride-alongs during search
warrants to arrests that occur outside of the home.76 Although the Court
found this to be a plausible interest, it nonetheless rejected the police department’s  argument  because  it  did  not  believe  the  police  department  had  
allowed  the  media  to  videotape  for  “quality  control.”77 Instead, the Court
found the ride-along was for the benefit of the media company.78
2. A Categorical Approach to the Policy Behind Media Ride-Alongs
In An   “Unholy   Alliance”:   The   Law   of   Media   Ride-Alongs, Karen
Markin discusses two theories to justify media ride-alongs.79 She purports
that  “ride-alongs [might serve as a] . . . check on government, a press function that flows from libertarian theory . . .  [and  might]  satisfy  the  public’s  
right to know, a press function that flows from the social responsibility theory.”80 The  libertarian  theory  values  the  “free  and  open  exchange  of  ideas  
as the best means of  achieving  truth,”81 while the social responsibility theory   is   based   on   “the   need   of   a   self-governing   people   to   be   informed.”82
Nonetheless, when analyzed under the First Amendment, neither theory
justifies the media ride-along.83
There is insufficient evidence   to  support  the   media’s   claim   that   it   is  
acting   as   a   “watchdog”   during   these   ride-alongs.84 Rather, the media is

74. Id. at 614.
75. Id. at 613.
76. The use of suspect protection and monitoring of police actions as a justification for media ride-alongs  is  not  only  applicable  to  search  warrants;;  the  media’s  presence  during  any  arrest  
or investigation may lead to suspect protection. See generally id.
77. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613.
78. Id.
79. Markin, supra note 10, at 34.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government
Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1982)).
82. Id. at 35 (quoting Helle, supra note 81).
83. Id. at 36.
84. Id.
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“colluding  with  the  government  when  it  rides  along.”85 This is contrary to
the libertarian theory that requires the media to serve as a check on the
government.86 Similarly, the social responsibility theory does not support
ride-alongs, as there is no real promotion of democracy with the accompanying of media.87 In fact, instead of guarding the rights of suspects during
police intrusion, the reporter’s  presence  serves  only  to  benefit  the  reporter’s  
own financial and entertainment purposes.88
In conclusion, neither the United States Supreme Court, nor Markin
could find a sufficient justification for media ride-alongs.89 Media ridealongs are mainly a benefit to the reporter.90
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE
A. What  Is  the  Reporter’s  Privilege  and  Why  Does  It  Exist?
The  First  Amendment’s  right  to  freedom  of  the  press  is  at  the  core  of  
the  reporter’s  privilege.91 If journalists and reporters were required to disclose their sources of confidential information, people would be reluctant to
give them such information.92 This would have a chilling effect on a reporter’s  work  product.93 As  a  result,  the  reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  protect journalists and reporters from being forced to disclose sources and in-

85. Markin, supra note 10, at 36.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 36–37.
88. Id.
89. See generally Wilson, 526 U.S. 603; see also Markin, supra note 10, at 60.
90. Markin, supra note 10, at 60 (concluding that the ride-along is not justified under the
libertarian theory or the social responsibility  theory.    Instead,  it  serves  the  media’s  interests.).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend.  I  (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of  grievances.”)  (emphasis  added); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972); Wright
v. FBI, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n  v.  McGraw-Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2005).
92. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547–48 (2d Cir. 1958) (referring to defendant Torre’s  claim  that  requiring  her  to  testify  would  “impose  an  important  practical  restraint  on  the  flow  
of news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news to
the  public”);;  see also In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  189,  193  (D.D.C.  2011)  (“Courts  have  minimized impositions upon the press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect on a reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”).
93. See In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  at  193  (“Courts  have  minimized  impositions upon the
press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect on a reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  
and  gather  news.”).
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formation  in  an  effort  to  prevent  “disrupting  the  ‘free  flow  of  information  
protected  by  the  First  Amendment.’”94
While  there  is   no   federal  statute   that  recognizes  the   reporter’s   privilege,95 forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes establishing   a   reporter’s   privilege,   also   known   as  shield  laws.96 Subsequently,
case law has defined the privilege so that both reporters and those who are
in need of the reporters’  testimony   understand   the   privilege   and  the   ways  
around it.97 Case law has established that the privilege is protected by the
Constitution,   and   has   recognized   “that   society’s   interest   in   protecting   the  
integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the public, is an interest of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration  of  justice.”98 Despite  the  occasional  need  for  such  sacrifice,  “[c]ourts  
have  rigorously  protected  reporters  asserting  [this]  privilege.”99
Among  the  cases  recognizing  the  reporter’s  privilege  is  a  1958  decision regarding famed actress/singer Judy Garland.100 Garland brought suit
against  CBS  after  learning  that  a  CBS  executive’s  comments about her had
been published in an article written by Marie Torre of the New York Herald
Tribune.101 Torre was imprisoned because she refused to disclose the identity of the executive who had made the comments.102 On appeal, Torre
raised the Constitutional   defense   of   the   First   Amendment’s   freedom   of  
speech.103 This was the first time a reporter had raised this defense.104 Torre  argued  that  requiring  her  to  testify  would  “impose  an  important  practical
restraint on the flow of news from news sources to news media and would

94. McGraw-Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
95. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16–1.
96. Number of States with Shield Law Climbs to 40, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
PRESS,
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-lawsummer-2011/number-states-shield-law-climbs (last visited Dec. 8, 2012).
97. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Garland, 259 F.2d 545; Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F.
Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2007); In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189; United States v. Sanusi, 813 F.
Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y 1992); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990); Miami Herald
Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  So.  2d  577  (Fla.  1990);;  Guccione,  supra note 9.
98. Wright, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (quotation marks omitted).
99. In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
100. Garland, 259 F.2d 545.
101. Id. at 547.
102. Id.
103. Id.; LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-5, 16-6. Garland was the first case to raise a constitutional  reporter’s  privilege.    Id. Torre raised the defense because states were hesitant in acknowledging a credible privilege, even though such privilege had been generally codified. Id. at 16-5.
104. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-5.
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thus diminish pro tanto the   flow   of   news   to   the   public.”105 The Second
Circuit unanimously acknowledged that while the privilege stemmed from
the freedom of press, since the information sought was at the heart of the
case and there were no alternative  sources  for  the  information,  “the  Constitution  conferred  no  right  to  refuse  an  answer.”106
It would not be until 1972 that the United States Supreme Court would
issue an opinion on the constitutionality of this issue.107 In the case of
Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court clarified the privilege.108
Branzburg consolidated four separate cases109 that   stemmed   “from   the   repeated clashes of the period between government, on the one hand, and allegedly violent, politically dissident groups and the so-called  ‘drug  culture,’  
on  the   other.”110 The cases concerned the groups that had confided in reporters about specific information pertaining to themselves in exchange for
the  reporters’  promise  that  their  names  would  remain  confidential.111 In an
effort to prosecute these groups, the government asked the courts to compel
the  reporters  to  testify  as  to  the  sources  of  information  regarding  the  groups’  
illegal  and  violent  habits  despite  their  claim  to  a  reporter’s  privilege.112
The United States Supreme Court concluded that reporters qualify for
some First Amendment protection, but that the protection is not absolute.113
The Court explained that reporters are subject to a privilege to avoid a violation
of their freedom of press and to minimize eliminating the flow of information
to the public.114 However, the Court refused to find a First Amendment defense applicable in this particular case since the burden of testifying did not
outweigh the need for law enforcement and effective grand jury proceedings.115 The Court stated:

105. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547–48.
106. Id. at 550.
107. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
108. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
109. Id. at 667–72 (the four consolidated cases were United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d
1081 (9th Cir. 1970), In re Papas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), and Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971)).
110. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-9.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 16-9, 16-10.
113. Branzburg,   408   U.S.   at   681   (“We   do   not   question   the   significance   of   free   speech,  
press,   or   assembly   to   the   country’s   welfare.      Nor   is   it   suggested   that   news   gathering   does   not  
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom  of  the  press  could  be  eviscerated.”).
114. See id. at 681–82.
115. Id. at  685  (“It  is  thus  not  surprising  that  the  great  weight  of  authority  is  that  newsmen  
are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering questions
relevant  to  a  criminal  investigation.”).
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[A] reporter should not be forced either to appear or to testify
before a grand jury or at trial until and unless sufficient grounds
are shown for believing that the reporter possesses information
relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and
that the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to
override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.116
Despite this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court made clear
that construction of the privilege would be at the discretion of state legislatures, but with limited restrictions.117 Following the Branzburg opinion,
many state and federal courts have addressed the scope of the reporter’s  
privilege.118 As   Justice   White   anticipated,   “[s]ooner   or   later,   it   would   be  
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege.”119 This  Article  addresses  Justice  White’s  suggestion  and  argues  that  
reporters who participate in media ride-alongs and are later asked to testify
in a criminal trial should be prevented from seeking the protection of the
reporter’s  privilege.
B. The Scope of Enforcement:
When and Why Has the Privilege Been Enforced?
Reporters and journalists have not been hesitant in asserting the reporter’s  privilege.120 The privilege has been raised in cases ranging from defamation suits,121 to First Amendment violations,122 and criminal proceedings.123

116. Id. at 680.
117. Id. at  706  (“There  is  also  merit  in  leaving  state  legislatures  free,  within  First  Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards  .  .  .  .”).
118. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.,
561 So. 2d 577; Guccione, supra note 9.
119. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704.
120. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Garland, 259 F.2d 545; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149;
In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189; Hatfill, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33. The plaintiff in Hatfill sought the
identities of sources from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice who
had spoken with the media regarding his alleged involvement with the anthrax letters. Id. at 36.
Several media companies, including The New York Times and the Associated Press, were asked to
reveal   their   source   for   information   regarding   the   plaintiff’s   affiliation   with   anthrax.      Id. at 48.
Their motion to quash the subpoena was granted since although their knowledge was at the heart
of the case, the plaintiff had alternative means to acquire that information. Id. at 49; Delaney, 789
P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d 577.
121. See, e.g., Garland, 259 F.2d 545.
122. See, e.g., In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189. A street performer requested the deposition
of   a   newspaper   reporter,   Donovan   Slack,   who   had   written   an   article   regarding   Boston’s   re-
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Compelling a reporter to testify is not uncommon, especially in a criminal case where the reporter was an eyewitness.124 In Delaney v. Superior
Court, Los Angeles Times reporter Roxana Kopetman and photographer
Roberto Santiago Bertero accompanied the Long Beach Police Department
during their daily duties.125 While on duty at the Long Beach Plaza Mall,
the police officers arrested Sean Patrick Delaney for misdemeanor possession of brass knuckles.126 Kopetman and Bertero were later subpoenaed to
testify  regarding  Delaney’s  consent  to  the  search,  but  refused,  asserting  their  
reporter’s  privilege.127 The Supreme Court of California compelled the reporter and photographer to testify, and after applying the balancing test, held
that the factors were overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant.128

strictions on street performers for The Boston Globe. Id. at 190–91. The plaintiff requested the
testimony to help prove that the city had violated his Constitutional right to free speech by restricting the areas. Id. at 196. Slack was subpoenaed but refused to comply, asserting his reporter’s  privilege.      Id. at 192. The court held that in applying a balancing test, which will later be
discussed in this article, Slack had correctly asserted his privilege and therefore was not forced to
comply. Id. at 198. Although the information Slack had and could testify to was critical in the
case, there were alternative means to obtain the same information such as asking local business
owners or residents. Id. at 197–98.    Therefore,  the  reporter’s  privilege  was  upheld.    Id. at 198.
123. See, e.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 986 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1999); Delaney, 789 P.2d 934;
People v. Vasco, 131 Cal. App. 4th 137 (2005).
124. JOEL M. GORA, THE RIGHTS OF REPORTERS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A REPORTER’S RIGHTS 50  (Norman  Dorsen  &  Aryeh  Neier  eds.,  1974)  (“Where  a  reporter  is  an  eyewitness to criminal activity or is told about it directly, courts have been unwilling to interpret the
shield  laws  to  allow  protection.”).
125. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937. Police approached Sean Patrick Delaney after seeing a type
of plastic bag in his possession commonly used to store drugs. Id. After questioning Delaney,
the officers requested that he provide them with his identification. Id. As Delaney reached for
his belongings, the officers searched his jacket and found a set of brass knuckles. Id. A few days
later, the Los Angeles Times published an article addressing the arrest. Id. Although the published article did not touch on the issue of consent, it did discuss the interaction between Delaney
and the officers. Id. The court also held that despite the fact that Article I of the California Constitution  states  that  a  “newsperson  shall  not  be  adjudged  in  contempt  for  ‘refusing  to  disclose  any
unpublished  information[,]’”  a  balancing  test  may  provide  cause  for  a  court  to  compel  a  reporter  
to testify. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 941, 947–52. Factors in the balancing test include whether the
unpublished information is confidential or sensitive, the interests of the reporter, the importance
of the information to the criminal defendant, and whether alternative sources are available (but
the court explained   that   “[i]n   light   of   a   defendant’s   constitutional   right   to   a   fair   trial,   however,  
Mitchell [v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 268 (1984)], a civil case, does not mandate a rigid alternative-source   requirement   in   criminal   proceedings.”).      Id. at 949–51. A threshold showing of
whether the issue is at the heart of the case is not required. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 937.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 953 (explaining that the information sought was not confidential, revealing the
information  would  not  impinge  on  the  reporter’s  newsgathering  ability,  the  information  was  important for Delaney, and that despite not needing to show an absolute lack of alternative sources,
there were no alternative sources for the information available to Delaney).
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If all other courts were to follow the conclusion of the Supreme Court
of  California,  the  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege  would  not  be  at  issue.129 However, since states are allowed to develop their own standards
for  the  reporter’s  privilege,130 there is no promise that they will follow California’s  lead.    In  fact,  there  is  a  wide  range  of  both  civil  and  criminal  cases  
that  have  addressed  the  reporter’s  privilege  nationwide.131 In some instances, the privilege has been denied, while in others, the courts have respected
the   reporter’s   privilege.132 In order to maintain consistency, most courts
have adopted a three-pronged test to help determine whether the reporter’s  
privilege trumps the subpoena.133
C. Compelling a Reporter to Testify
The  reporter’s  privilege,  commonly  asserted  by  reporters  who  refuse
to testify about sources and other confidential materials, is subject to a
three-pronged test that pre-dates Branzburg v. Hayes.134 This test has been
solidified through decades of case law and legislation.135
To compel a reporter to testify, there must be   a   “clear   and   specific”  
showing of each element of the test.136 First, the information must be highly

129. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (ordering the reporter who had participated in a ridealong  to  testify,  but  only  based  on  the  reporter’s  own  observation—it is not a hard and fast rule
that reporters who attended ride-alongs must testify during subsequent criminal proceedings if
asked to do so).
130. Branzburg,  408  U.S.  at  706  (“There  is  also  merit  in  leaving  state  legislatures  free,  within  First  Amendment  limits,  to  fashion  their  own  standards  .  .  .  .”).
131. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189; Miller, 986 P.2d 170; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. Greenberg, 511 N.E.2d
1116, 1117–21 (N.Y. 1987) (confirming, when a television station moved to quash a subpoena to
produce  videotapes  of  an  interview  with  a  homicide  suspect,  that  there  is  “a  strong  desire  to  safeguard  the  free  channels  of   news  communication  .  .  .  .”    With  this  understanding, the court held
that since   “the   taped   interview   presumably   contain[ed]   relevant   information   necessary   to   the  
Grand  Jury  investigation  and  [the  information  was]  unavailable  from  other  sources,”  the  reporter’s  privilege  would  not  protect  the  television station.).
132. Compare Delaney, 789 P.2d 934 (holding that journalists must testify despite assertion
of  reporter’s  privilege),  with People v. Slover, 753 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that
the photographer did not have to produce photos because privilege was properly asserted).
133. James C. Goodale et al., Reporter’s  Privilege, 987 PLI/PAT 135, 160 (2009); see also
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906 (1991); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1990);
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947.
134. Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743.
135. Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947.
136. In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
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material and relevant to the underlying claim;137 the information cannot be
“merely   cumulative,”138 nor   can   it   be   “vague   and   wholly   unsupported.”139
Second, the information must be necessary or critical to the maintenance of
the  party’s  claim.140 In  other  words,  the  information  must  be  at  the  “heart  of  
the  case.”141 In Delaney, however, the Supreme Court of California lowered
this standard for criminal cases so that  “a  criminal  defendant  must  show  a  
reasonable possibility the  information  will  materially  assist  his  defense,”142
not that the information affected the heart of his case.143 Lastly, the party
compelling disclosure must have exhausted all other alternative sources of
obtaining the information.144 However, the court in Delaney lowered this
standard   as   well,   concluding   “a   universal   and   inflexible alternative-source
requirement is inappropriate in a criminal proceeding.”145
Furthermore, most states have adopted some variation of the reporter’s  privilege,  and,  in  doing  so,  have  given  depth  to  the  scope  of  the  privilege.146 However,   reporter’s   privilege   statutes   in   California,   Illinois,   and  

137. Id.; see also Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Delaney, 789 P.2d at
947; Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160.
138. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 667, 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
139. In re Application of Behar, 779 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
140. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 7; see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at
713; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160.
141. See Miller v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 602 F. Supp. 675, 676–81 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (explaining that parties to the case requested a reporter to disclose the source of information relating
to  a  death.    Since  this  information   was  at  the  core  of  the  plaintiff’s  theory,  the  court  found  that  
“names   of   the   confidential   source   and   witness not only go to the   heart   of   plaintiff’s   case,   they  
very well may be the heart of the case.”);;  see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713; Goodale et al., supra
note 133, at 160.
142. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 948.
143. Id.
144. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 7; see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at
713; Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160; In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (holding that the
plaintiff had not exhausted all alternative sources for information regarding street performance
conditions because he had not sought the information from residents, local business owners, or
other street vendors); In re Ramaekers, 33 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (indicating the
movants requested Reuters News Services to produce all tapes and documents relating to an interview made for a securities litigation inquiry. Since there was no other available source for this
information, the court found that the movant had exhausted all possible alternatives in an attempt
to obtain the necessary information.); Miller, 602 F. Supp. at 680 (holding that the requirement of
exhausting all alternative sources had been satisfied when plaintiff had deposed all possible witnesses before trial and had reviewed results from other investigations).
145. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 951.
146. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-4, 16-5.
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New York, demonstrate that variations exist between the states.147 For example, New York draws clear distinctions between an absolute protection
for confidential information,148 and a qualified protection for nonconfidential information,149 while California adopts a more general protection for all information.150 Moreover, Illinois has separated the reporter’s  
privilege among nine different statutes, each of which expands upon a specific type of information.151 Despite their differences, most states have
been faced with criminal cases in which reporters who participated in media ride-alongs witnessed an arrest and refused to testify.152

147. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h.
148. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)   (“Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt: Absolute protection for confidential news. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional journalist . . . shall be adjudged in contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, or by the
legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist
or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature or other body having contempt powers
for refusing or failing to disclose any news obtained or received in confidence or the identity of
the source of any such news coming into such person’s  possession  in  the  course  of  gathering  or  
obtaining news for publication or to be published . . . .”).
149. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c)   (“Exemption   of   professional   journalists   and   newscasters from contempt: Qualified protection for nonconfidential news. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional journalist or newscaster . . .
shall be adjudged in contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding,
or by the legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a
journalist or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature, or other body having contempt
powers for refusing or failing to disclose any unpublished news obtained or prepared by a journalist or newscaster in the course of gathering or obtaining news as provided in subdivision (b) of
this section, or the source of any such news, where such news was not obtained or received in
confidence  .  .  .  .”).  
150. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b)  (“A  publisher,  editor,  reporter  .  .  .  shall  not  be  adjudged  in  
contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any other body having the power to
issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the source of any information . . . or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication  to  the  public.”).
151. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901  (“Source  of  Information”);;  735   ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8-902  (“Definitions”);;  735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-903  (“Application  to  Court”);;  735  ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/8-904  (“Contents  of  Applications”);;  735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-905  (“Civil  Proceeding”);;  
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906   (“Consideration   by   Court”);;   735   ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907
(“Court’s  Findings”);;  735   ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-908  (“Privilege  Continues  During  Pendency  of  
Appeal”);;  735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-909  (“Contempt”).
152. See, e.g., Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 658 (holding that because the defendant did not reasonably   show   that   the   information   would   materially   assist   her   defense,   the   reporter’s   privilege  
was upheld); Slover, 753 N.E.2d 554 (noting that a newspaper was asked to submit unpublished
photographs associated with a murder  but  refused  to  do  so,  claiming  a  reporter’s  privilege.    The  
lower  court  held  that  the  reporter’s  privilege  did  not  apply  in  such  matters.    On  appeal,  the  Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that photographers were analogous to reporters in that photographs were a source of information, and thus the lower court erred in its ruling. The information
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Despite the variety between state statutes, none of the statutes create
an absolute exemption from the privilege for media ride-along participants.153 Some cases, like Delaney, have indirectly asserted this exception
by lowering the standards of the three-pronged test, thus compelling reporters to testify.154 However, a more concrete exemption is necessary. The
media ride-along has helped further the free flow of information; in return
for this benefit, reporters who participate in media ride-alongs should
waive  their  right  to  assert  the  reporter’s  privilege.
IV. HOW TO ADJUST TO THE PHENOMENON OF RIDE-ALONGS
Media ride-alongs have had a significant impact on the judicial system.155 As with all other rapidly evolving forms of communication, such as
e-mail, and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter,156 the Supreme
Court or Congress must adjust to the prevalence of media ride-alongs. They
should mandate that reporters who are allowed to go on media ride-alongs
be   exempt   from   the   reporter’s   privilege   and   be   required   to   maintain   any  
notes and information gathered during these ride-alongs to provide a fair trial for criminal defendants.157 This proposed exception will not only protect
a   criminal   defendant’s   Sixth   Amendment right to a fair trial but will also
maintain the freedom of press firmly established by the First Amendment.158
was  in  fact  protected  by  the  reporter’s  privilege.);;  People  v.  Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. App.
1993) (mentioning that the police requested helicopter media coverage of marijuana bust).
153. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; see, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h(c).
154. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953.
155. Guccione, supra note 9; see, e.g., United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y.
1992);;  Delaney  v.  Superior  Court,  789  P.2d  934  (Cal.  1990);;  Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,
561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990); People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643 (Ct. App. 2005); People v. Slover,
753 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. App. 1993).
156. Darren Waters, Social  Networks  “Are  New  E-mail”, BBC (Mar. 15, 2009), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7942304.stm.
157. The  reporter’s  privilege  seeks  to  maintain  the  flow  of  information  by  ensuring  that  confidences will not be revealed, but a defendant being subjected to a search warrant has no reasonable expectation of confidentially pertaining to the reporter at that time. See Wright v. F.B.I., 381
F.   Supp.   2d   1114,   1116   (C.D.   Cal.   2005)   (stating   the   reporter’s   privilege   exists   to   promote   the  
“free   flow   of   information”);;   see also In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“Courts have minimized impositions upon the press, particularly when burdens may have a
chilling  effect  on  a  reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”).    However,  reporters  who  
participate in media ride-alongs are not present for the purpose of a scheduled meeting or photo
shoot. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (emphasizing that the reporters were accompanying the
police  with  the  police’s  permission).    The  reporter  is  present  as  a  mere  observer,  not  a  confidant.    
See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that
reporter Miles Corwin was present to observe the investigation).
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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A. Reporters on Ride-Alongs Lose Their Privilege and
Enter  the  Class  of  “Police”
Members of the media become constructive members of the police
force when they partake in ride-alongs. When police officers arrest someone, they write an incident report.159 If the prosecution files a case against
the individual who was arrested, the police officers may be subpoenaed to
testify to the events of that arrest.160 This procedure exists as part of the defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.161 Reporters or journalists should be subject
to the same rule. The notes they take during these media ride-alongs are
just like the incident reports that the police officers write.162 During the
ride-along, the reporters and journalists record every incident that may later
lead to a criminal arrest.163 Just like police incident reports, these recorded
initial incidents can become crucial facts in a criminal proceeding.164
Moreover, some police departments acknowledge that a person on a
ride-along becomes a member of the police force.165 For example, before
Los Angeles Times reporter Miles Corwin could accompany the Los Angeles Police Department for a year, he was required to sign an agreement.166
Specifically,  the  agreement  stated  that  “by his involvement in homicide investigations,  [he]  becomes  an  ‘agent’  of  the  Police  Department.”167
Finally, any media member who accompanies police officers should
be thought of as an agent of the police department because the police de-

159. Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions: Police Officer, LAPD,
http://www.lapdonline.org/join_the_team/content_basic_view/9127#Police%20Officer (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
160. See Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions: Police Officer, supra note
159; FAQ, NYPD, http://www.nypdrecruit.com/faq (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
161. If  the  judicial  system  “depend[s]  on  full  disclosure  of  all  the  facts,”  then  police  testimony of facts helps ensure that all facts are disclosed. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
162. Compare Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions: Police Officer, supra note 159 (stating that the duties of police officers include conducting investigations, preparing investigative reports, and writing crime reports), with Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note  13,  at  24  (citing  to  Miles  Corwin’s  commentary  regarding  the  interior  
of  Robert  Blake’s  house).
163. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151 (CBS cameraman filmed for twenty minutes during a search warrant).
164. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (stating that a reporter on a media ride-along that
was present during the search of defendant was later subpoenaed to testify to whether defendant
consented to the search).
165. Guccione, supra note 9.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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partment’s  resources  allow  the  reporter  to  obtain  his  or  her  information.168
For example, search warrants allow reporters to enter the homes of private
residents.169 The  police  department’s  communication  system  also leads reporters to locations where crimes may occur.170 Additionally, the tips from
police department insiders result in drug busts.171 Without the approval and
insight of the police department, members of the media who go on ridealongs with the police would not have access to such information.172 For
this reason, upon entering the police car, members of the media should step
out of their role as reporters and into the class of the police.
B. The Exception Satisfies the Three-Pronged Test
The party seeking the  “privileged”  information  must  prove  that  (1)  the  
information is highly material and relevant, (2) the information is necessary
or   critical   to   the   maintenance   of   the   party’s   claim,   and   (3)   all   alternative  
sources of the information have been exhausted.173 As demonstrated below, there is no question that any time a criminal defendant requests the
notes or coverage of an eyewitness reporter present during a media ridealong, all three prongs are satisfied.
First, the information reporters gather during media ride-alongs is
highly material and relevant; otherwise, the criminal defendant would
not be requesting the material. 174 The criminal defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to call witnesses in his favor and to question
those against him. 175 A criminal defendant would not request that the jury   hear   the   testimony   of   a   reporter   unless   it   was   in   the   defendant’s   fa-

168. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999); Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151–
52 (illustrating that the camera crew entered the house along with the police pursuant to a
search warrant).
169. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151–52.
170. See generally Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 579.
171. See, e.g., Henderson, 847 P.2d at 240 (explaining that the police requested helicopter
media coverage of marijuana bust).
172. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (explaining that the journalist,
participating on a media ride-along, took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine and later published an article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine).
173. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1990); see also 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/8-906 (1991).
174. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (noting that the reporter was with the police when
the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of the
few people who knew exactly what happened).
175. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
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vor.176 Even if that were not the case, requesting information by an objective  party  about  the  events  leading  up  to  the  defendant’s  arrest,  by its
own terms, renders the information highly material. 177 A  reporter’s  notes  
taken during ride-alongs can help determine what exactly happened,
what the circumstances were, and how the events of the accident, arrest,
or search took place, which is highly material information during a criminal trial.178
For similar reasons, the second prong is also satisfied.179 The exposure of this material is highly critical and necessary if a criminal defendant
is requesting it.180 This is true if only for the mere fact that it allows the defendant to exercise his constitutional right to subpoena evidence he believes will be in his favor.181 In a criminal case, all admissible and relevant
evidence is needed to ensure a verdict is returned in the fairest manner to
the defendant —whether it helps prove or disprove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.182 The standard for this prong may be even lower if the holding
in Delaney v. Superior Court is adopted.183 There,   the   court   held   that   “a  
176. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (noting that the reporter was with the police when
the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of the
few people who knew exactly what happened). See generally Rock, 483 U.S. at 52.
177. Rock,  483  U.S.  at  51  (“A  person’s  right  to  reasonable  notice  of  a  charge  against  him,  
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in our system
of jurisprudence; and these rights include, at a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against
him,  to  offer  testimony,  and  to  be  represented  by  counsel.”)  (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1948)) (emphasis omitted).
178. See, e.g., Miami   Herald   Publ’g   Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (noting that the reporter was
present when police first encountered the defendant at the airport and arrested him for trafficking
in cocaine); Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (discussing that the reporter was with the police when the
police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of the few
other people who knew exactly what happened).
179. The information requested must be necessary or critical to the maintenance of the party’s   claim.      See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h(c).
180. See generally Rock,   483   U.S.   at   52   (discussing   the   defendant’s   compulsory right to
subpoena information in his or her favor).
181. See id. at 52.
182. See generally Delaney,  789  P.2d  at  948  (“A  criminal  defendant’s  constitutional right to
compulsory process was intended to permit him to request governmental assistance in obtaining
likely helpful evidence, not just evidence that he can show beforehand will go to the heart of his
case. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive.”) (quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. (“[T]o  overcome  a  prima  facie  showing  by  a  newsperson  that  he  is  entitled  to  withhold information under the shield law, a criminal defendant must show a reasonable possibility
the information will materially assist his defense. A criminal defendant is not required to show
that   the   information   goes   to   the   heart   of   his   case.”);;   see also Notice of Motion and Motion to
Suppress Evidence, supra note  13,  at  24  (“Mr.  Blake  need  not show a reasonable possibility the
information will lead to his exoneration: he need only show, rather, a reasonable possibility the
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criminal defendant must show a reasonable possibility the information will
materially  assist  his  defense.”184 Since the higher standard is satisfied, the
lower standard will be fulfilled as well.185
Finally, the information reporters observe during media ride-alongs is
unique, and no alternative source is available for that same information.186
If the standard to be applied is like the one discussed in Delaney,187 it is
clear that this prong is satisfied. In Delaney,  the  court  found  that  the  “universal and inflexible alternative-source requirement is inappropriate in a
criminal  proceeding.”188 With a more lax standard, it will be easier to conclude that the few people permitted to be present during an arrest or police
encounter, the privileged reporter being one of them, greatly limits the
number of potential sources of information.189
However, the prong is still satisfied even if a higher standard is applied.190 There are only a few people who will have observed an accident,
arrest, and/or search—the parties to the case, the police officers, and the
media.191 The police officers will write their incident reports and the reporters will take down their notes.192 While it may be argued that the incident
reports are an alternative means to gather information observed by the reporter, the bias present in the incident reports will presumably be absent in

information will materially assist  his  defense,”  and  that  “balancing  the  various  factors in this case
weighs  no  less  ‘overwhelmingly’  in  favor  of  requiring  Mr.  Corwin  to  testify  than  in  Delaney.”).
184. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 948.
185. The higher standard requires that the information be highly critical and necessary while
the lower standard simply mandates that there is a reasonable possibility that the information will
help the  defendant’s  case.    See id. at 948–49. If evidence is so necessary as to be needed by the
defendant, it is without question  that  the  material  is  necessary  because  it  will  help  the  defendant’s  
case. See generally id. For this reason, if the higher standard is satisfied, the information will
automatically satisfy the lower standard as well. See generally id.
186. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c).
187. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 951.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (explaining that the journalist
took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine and later published an
article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine containing some information that was inconsistent with what the police officers had reported. The journalist was compelled to testify despite   assertion   of   the   reporter’s   privilege.      The   journalist,   police,   and   defendant   were   the   only  
people involved, which limited the sources of evidence.).
190. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-h(c) (no alternative source is available for the information sought).
191. See Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions: Police Officer, supra
note 159.
192. Id.; see also Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (mentioning that the reporter
was present and took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine).
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the   reporter’s   notes.193 Reporters have a duty to inform the public of the
truth and their notes are often what reflect that truth.194 Unlike the police,
they do not have a stake in the arrest or incident.195 Therefore, it is clear that
a  reporter’s  eyewitness  account  is  highly  material,  necessary,  and  unique.
C. Other Privileges Have Also Been Subject to Similar Exceptions
The federal government has not codified any privileges.196 However,
states have acted independently and created numerous privileges among
which are the attorney-client privilege,197 the physician-patient privilege,198
the psychotherapist-patient privilege,199 and   the   reporter’s   privilege.200 In
California, most privileges include a codified exception where harm to another will follow if the privileged information is not divulged.201
California Evidence Code section 956.5 permits an attorney to reveal
confidential information violating the attorney-client confidentially privilege,  “to  prevent  a  criminal  act  that  the  lawyer reasonably believes is likely
to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.”202
Further, in California, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which ordinarily protects communications between a therapist and patient during treatment,203 must  be  violated  if  the  therapist  “has  reasonable  cause  to  believe  
that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous

193. See State v. Riley, 381 So. 2d 1359, 1360 (Fla. 1980) (questioning whether a police
officer knowingly falsified police reports); see also Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578
(explaining that the journalist was present and took notes while the police arrested the defendant
for trafficking in cocaine and later published an article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine containing some information that was inconsistent with what police officers had reported.
The  journalist  was  compelled  to  testify  despite  assertion  of  the  reporter’s  privilege.).
194. See Wright, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
195. See id. (discussing that reporters have a duty to inform the public). Police officers, on
the other hand, have the duty to keep communities safe, and deciding whether to arrest a suspect
is in furtherance of that duty. See generally Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions: Police Officer, supra note 159.
196. See generally FED. R. EVID. 501.
197. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950–62 (West 2011).
198. See, e.g., id. §§ 990–1007 (West 2011).
199. See, e.g., id. §§ 1010–28 (West 2011).
200. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
201. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (discussing the attorney-client privilege); id.
§ 1024 (discussing the psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. § 998 (discussing the physicianpatient privilege).
202. Id. § 956.5.
203. Id. §§ 1010, 1012.
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to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to  prevent  the  threatened  danger.”204
The physician-patient privilege is also subject to exceptions.205 Despite the fact California has not codified a specific exception to the privilege, California Evidence Code section 998 nonetheless applies and generally states  “there  is  no  privilege  in  this  article  in  a  criminal  proceeding.”206
This means that if a physician were subpoenaed for a criminal case involving a patient, he or she would not be able to assert the physician-patient
privilege and refuse to testify.207
An  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege  requiring  media  who  participate in ride-alongs to testify in criminal cases would constitute a similar
exception to those established in the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.208 The exception  is  needed  to  protect  a  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.209 In doing
so, the reporter would ultimately be preventing substantial harm to another—a false or unfair conviction of the defendant in question.210 For this
reason, exceptions have been made to other privileges, and now the reporter’s  privilege demands a similar exception.
D.    A  Criminal  Defendant’s  Sixth  Amendment  Right  to  a  Fair  Trial  Trumps  
a  Reporter’s  First  Amendment  Right to Freedom of Press when that
Reporter Participates in a Media Ride-Along
The  reporter’s  privilege  stems  from  the  First  Amendment  of the United States Constitution.211 The right to a fair trial is inscribed in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.212 The exception proposed
204. Id. § 1024.
205. CAL. EVID. CODE § 998 (falling under the physician-patient privilege section of the
Code.).
206. Id.
207. People   v.   Ditson,   369   P.2d   714,   733   (Cal.   1962)   (“There is, of course, no doctorpatient  privilege  in  criminal  cases.”).
208. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (discussing the attorney-client privilege); id.
§ 1024 (discussing the psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. § 998 (discussing the physicianpatient privilege).
209. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
210. See Sarah A. Mourer, Gateway to Justice: Constitutional Claims to Actual Innocence,
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1279,   1304   (2010)   (“The   Sixth   Amendment   right   to   counsel   protects   the  
innocent from wrongful conviction, incarceration, and execution. The Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation encourages truth finding to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction, incarceration,  and  execution.”).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
212. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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in this Article benefits the criminal defendant and impinges upon the First
Amendment right of the reporter. Thus, this Comment urges that in this
narrow area, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial should trump the
First Amendment right to freedom of press.
A  reporter’s  right  to  freedom  of  press,  embedded  in  the  First  Amendment, does not overcome the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.213 A
criminal  defendant’s  due  process  depends  on  receiving  a  fair  trial;;  without  
a fair trial, a criminal defendant is deprived of the right to due process.214
A  fair  trial  is  the  defendant’s  only  chance  at  freedom  from  conviction  and  
the  subsequent  “social  stigma  of  being  labeled  as  [a]  criminal[]”  for  the  rest  
of his or her life.215 As   a   result,   “a   newsperson’s   protection under the
shield  law  must  yield  to  a  criminal  defendant’s  constitutional  right  to  a  fair  
trial   when   the   newsperson’s   refusal   to   disclose   information   would   unduly  
infringe  on  that  right.”216 This  “constitutional  right  to  compulsory  process  
was intended to permit [the defendant] to request governmental assistance
in obtaining likely helpful evidence, not just evidence that [the defendant]
can show beforehand will go to the heart of his case.”217 Compulsory process requires that the defendant be entitled to expose all relevant information  to  ensure  the  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.218
In United States v. Nixon, the United States Supreme Court established and clearly expressed
[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a
partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of
the rules of evidence.219
Professor Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School stated
[t]he media plays an important role as a watchdog. When they are
at the scene, then the information that they have might be im213. Id. at amends. I, VI. See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
214. See Rock, 483 U.S. 51–52
215. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 689 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
216. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937.
217. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
218. People v. Hendrix, 820 N.Y.S.2d 411, 417 (App. Div. 2006); see also Nixon, 418
U.S.  at  709  (“To  ensure  that  justice  is  done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or
by  the  defense.”).  
219. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.

08. HOVSEPIAN (DO NOT DELETE)

362

12/30/2012 1:04 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:335

portant enough to outweigh their general privilege not to testify.
In the end, no matter how important we think the First Amendment is, it is not more important than the right to a fair trial.220
In furthering this opinion, M. Gerald Schwartzbach, counsel for Robert Blake during his murder trial in 2005, commented,
[t]hough freedom of the press is essential to any democracy, a reporter who voluntarily elects to become a witness to a criminal
investigation should not be permitted to remain silent when he or
she possesses relevant information. To conclude otherwise would
be to allow him or her to remain silent in the face of police error
or misconduct and thus deny an accused the right to a fair trial.221
Although there is arguably a need for balance between the First and
Sixth Amendments, a First Amendment claim is not substantial enough to justify superiority over the Sixth Amendment.222 For this reason, the Sixth
Amendment’s  guarantee  of  a  fair  trial,  with  access  to  all  evidence  pursuant  to  
compulsory process, trumps the First Amendment right to freedom of press.223
E. Public Policy Favors the Exception
This Article prescribes an absolute and codified exception to the reporter’s  privilege.    Imposing  the  exception  can  be  made  feasible  by  requiring  police departments to include a waiver clause in their ride-along agreements for
media members.224 However,  because  the  reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  promote the freedom of press and an informed public,225 there is a concern that
the proposed exception might have a chilling effect on reporters.226
220. Interview with Laurie Levenson, Professor at Law, Loyola Law School, in Los Angeles, California (Nov. 21, 2011).
221. E-mail from M. Gerald Schwartzbach, Attorney for Robert Blake, Law Offices of M.
Gerald Schwartzbach, P.C., to author (Nov. 21, 2011, 5:46 PM) (on file with author).
222. George Blum et al., Protection in Criminal Proceedings, 31A CAL. JUR. 3D 599
(2012); see Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654–55.
223. Interview with Levenson, supra note   220   (“The   media   plays   an   important   role   as   a  
watchdog. When they are at the scene, then the information that they have might be important
enough to outweigh their general privilege not to testify. In the end, no matter how important we
think  the  First  Amendment  is,  it  is  not  more  important  than  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.”).
224. Guccione, supra note 9. The court believed that Corwin had waived his shield law
privilege. Id. If police departments always include a waiver stating that the media member
waives his or her reporter’s  privilege,  the  reporter  becomes  an  “agent”  of  the  police  department,  
and  “that  [his  or  her]  work  product  may  be  subject to subpoena and production in either criminal
and/or  civil  litigation,”  the  exception will be imposed with little effort. Id.
225. Wright, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
226. See In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  at  193  (“Courts  have  minimized  impositions upon the
press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect on a reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  
and  gather  news.”).
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Nonetheless,  this  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege  would  not  have  a  
chilling effect because it would not violate any privileges of the reporters.
Forcing  the  reporter  to  testify  “involves  no  restraint  on  what  newspapers  may  
publish or on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to acquire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships between
reporters  and  their  sources.”227 In  fact,  “[t]he  reporters  are  not  being asked to
breach a confidence or to disclose sensitive information that would in any
way even remotely restrict their news-gathering ability. All that is being required of them is that they accept the civic responsibility imposed on all persons   who   witness  alleged   criminal   conduct.”228 Thus, the proposed exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege,  effectuated  through  a  waiver,  will  serve  as  the  
consideration for the right to participate in a media ride-along.
This exception is not proposed to hinder the free flow of information or
to halt reporters’   investigations.229 On the contrary, requiring the reporters
on these ride-alongs to testify only promotes the free flow of information;
specifically, this exception will lead to the reporting of truthful and accurate
accounts of investigations and arrests by an objective and neutral party.230
V. CONCLUSION
The  influx  of  cases  challenging  the  reporter’s  privilege  illustrates  the  
need to clarify its scope.231 Undoubtedly, the new phenomenon of media
ride-alongs has left reporters with a benefit—an opportunity to be an eyewitness.232 Additionally, reporters are given a privilege that exempts them
from having to testify at criminal trials.233 Recent cases have shown that
this  reporter’s  privilege  occasionally  conflicts  with  a  criminal  defendant’s  
right to a fair trial.234 Judges grant motions made by criminal defendants
227. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
228. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953.
229. Wright,  381  F.  Supp.  2d  at  1116  (stating  that  the  purpose  of  the  reporter’s  privilege  is  
to  “ensur[e]  the  free  flow  of  information”).    
230. See generally Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (noting that the reporter was with the police
when the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of
the few people who knew exactly what happened).
231. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
232. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 937 (Cal. 1990) (noting that the
reporter was present during the arrest therefore had direct knowledge of whether or not the defendant  consented  to  the  police  touching  his  jacket);;  Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.   v.  Morejon,  561  
So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 1990) (discussing the presence of the reporter when the police encountered
the defendant at the airport and arrested him for trafficking in cocaine).
233. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (1991); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW §79-h (McKinney 1990).
234. See, e.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 986 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1999); Delaney, 789 P.2d 934;
People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643 (2005).
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and  order  reporters  to  testify  to  eyewitness  accounts  despite  the  reporter’s  
assertion of this privilege.235 In light of the privilege received by reporters,
the Latin saying of quid pro quo should be remembered.236
By allowing reporters and journalists to act as constructive police officers, thereby entitling them to some of the privileges that officers maintain, such as being present during an arrest when initial actions are taken
and decisions made, it is only fair that reporters give up a privilege of their
own,  namely,  the  reporter’s  privilege.237 This Article does not suggest terminating  the  reporter’s  privilege  in  its  entirety,  nor  does  it  propose  a  violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.238 For the
sole purpose of providing a fair trial for criminal defendants, this Article
recommends a narrow exception to the well established privilege for those
reporters who participate in media ride-alongs—an exception that does not
intrude  upon  the  underlying  purpose  of  the  reporter’s  privilege.239 Not only
would such an exception satisfy the three-pronged test adopted by most jurisdictions for violating the privilege, but such an exception to the reporter’s  privilege  would  also  be  consistent with the trend of courts to compel
reporters who participated in a ride-along to testify.240

235. See, e.g., Guccione, supra note 9; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.,
561 So. 2d 577; United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
236. Quid pro quo, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/quid%
2Bpro%2Bquo?region=us&q=quid+pro+quo (last visited Dec. 10,   2012)   (“a   favor   or   advantage  
granted or expected in  return  for  something”).
237. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 (stating
that reporter Miles Corwin participated in witness interviews); see also Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.,
561 So. 2d at 578 (noting that the reporter was present and took notes while the police arrested
the defendant for trafficking in cocaine); Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (discussing that the reporter on
a media ride-along was present when police searched the defendant and found him in possession
of brass knuckles).
238. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
239. The  reporter’s  privilege  seeks  to  maintain  the  flow  of  information  by  ensuring  that  confidences will not be revealed, but the defendant being subject to a search warrant has no reasonable expectation of confidentially pertaining to the reporter at that time. Wright v. F.B.I., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating the reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  promote  the  “free  
flow of information”)  (internal  citation  omitted);;  see also In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193
(D.D.C.   2011)   (“Courts   have   minimized   impositions   upon   the   press,   particularly   when   burdens  
may have a chilling effect  on  a  reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”).    However,  reporters who participate in media ride-alongs are not present for the purpose of a scheduled meeting or photo shoot. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (emphasizing that the reporters were accompanying the police with police permission). The reporter is present as a mere observer, not a
confidant. See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8
(stating that reporter Miles Corwin was present to observe the investigation).
240. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Guccione, supra note 9; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.,
561 So. 2d 577; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149.

